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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to implement risk-based models for the inspection procedures in the 
organic certification. Organic products have a specific regulation concerning labelling at the 
European  level.  The  European  organic  logo  assures  that  products  are  obtained  respecting 
common standards set by organic regulation. The implementation of the certification is delegated 
to national and regional competent authorities, which then assign the inspection and certification 
procedures to accredited and approved control bodies. A risk-based approach, that could inform 
control  bodies  in  planning  inspections,  can  contribute  to  a  more  efficient  and  cost-effective 
certification system. Our analysis is based on a dataset obtained from the largest Italian organic 
certification body concerning the records of the inspection made over the period 2007-2009. The 
dataset contains structural and managerial data for the certified farms, and the outcomes of the 
inspection  visits,  in  terms  of  types  and  number  of  sanctions  issued  for  each  inspected  farm. 
Sanctions for non-compliance are classified as slight or severe, respectively referring to formal-
bureaucratic noncompliance, and to more important violation of the disciplinary. Our aim is to 
analyse the relationship between the type of sanctions a farm receives, and the farm’s structure 
and  productions,  aiming  at  the  definition  of  potential  risk  factors.  Two  distinct  models  are 
considered, respectively for slight and severe sanctions. Given the large share of farms with zero 
sanctions, we apply zero inflated Poisson models to farm-level panel data. Results show that 
there is evidence of the role of co-dependence effects between the two types of sanctions in 
predicting the risk of non-compliances. Other common risk factors for both types of sanctions are 
grapes and livestock production. Specific factors increasing the risk of non-compliance are also 
found for slight sanctions (dry pulses, root crops, farm size and processing) and severe sanctions 
(cereals),  while  fruit  and  olives  production  reduce  the  risk  on  slight  and  severe  sanctions 
respectively. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The organic sector in Europe now involves more than 250,000 producers, of which 208,000 are 
located within the European Union (EU) (FIBL, 2011). Italy is one of the leading countries in the 
EU organic sector: it has the largest number of organic farms, while in terms of organic land area, 
it is second only to Spain. The organic sector in Italy has also grown rapidly in recent years. The 
certified land area increased from less than 200,000 ha in 1995 to nearly 1 million ha in 2009, 
while the number of operators in 2009 was just over 48,000.
(1)  
Certification procedures are a key feature of organic farming systems today, because only 
certified organic products can be labelled as such, thereby gaining access to the organic market 
and selling at premium prices.
(2) However, the costs of the certification system are mainly borne 
by the organic farmers and processors, and therefore this can reduce the relative competitiveness 
of  organic  farming.  A  more  efficient  certification  system  would  contribute  to  a  significant 
reduction  in  the  costs  in  the  organic  supply  chain,  and  hence  positively  impact  on  the 
consumption of organic food while maintaining the benefits of trusted organic labelling.    3 
The organic certification system is essentially based on inspections that are carried out by 
independent bodies (third-party certification), in accordance with the standards laid down by EU 
Regulation  (EC)  834/07.  This  Regulation  provides  general  guidelines  for  control  visits  and 
inspections,  which  should  be  based  on  risk  assessments  for  non-compliance.  A  risk-based 
inspection  approach  would  assist  the  control  bodies,  allowing  them  to  plan  better-targeted, 
unannounced inspections, and hence this would contribute to a more cost-effective system. While 
the  potential  for  a  risk-based  inspection  system  in  organic  certification  has  been  recently 
discussed  by  stakeholders  (see,  for  example,  Zanoli,
(3)  Padel
(4)),  relatively  few  studies  have 
analysed the functioning of the organic certification and inspection systems from an empirical 
point of view. Gambelli et al.
(5) provided a methodological approach to risk analysis for organic 
certification. Gambelli and Solfanelli
(6) developed and implemented a Bayesian network model 
for the evaluation of the risk of non-compliance of a group of Italian organic farms. De Gennaro 
and Roselli
(7) analysed the organic certification system in Apulia in terms of its efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
One aim of the present study was to initially identify farm-level structural and managerial 
factors that affect the probability of non-compliance of Italian organic farms.  
This probability does not, however, fully encompass the risk that is associated to non-
compliance. The magnitude of risk is related to the probability of non-compliance to occur, and 
also  to  the  potential  consequences  that  might  derive  from  the  non-compliance  itself,  for  the 
organic sector, the consumer, and society as a whole. This general approach to risk evaluation is 
acknowledged in the European regulations relating to the food sector, where risk is defined as “a 
function  of  the  probability  of  an  adverse  health  effect  and  the  severity  of  that  effect, 
consequential to a hazard”.
1 
However, here we follow the more specific approach of Regulation (EC) 834/2007, which 
defines the organic production rules and uses the term ‘risk’ in the sense of the probability of not 
fulfilling  the  requirements  laid  down  in  these  Regulations.  This  study  therefore  analyses  the 
factors  that  have  an  impact  on  the  probability  of  non-compliance,  as  a  contribution  for  the 
definition of a risk-based inspection system in the organic sector. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The data are described in section 2, while the 
count-data models used for the analysis are discussed in section 3. The results are presented in 
                                                 
1 See Article 3(9) of EU Regulation 178/2002.   4 
section 4, and discussed in section 5. The paper is then completed with the general conclusions 
on the factors that explain the probability of non-compliance in Italian organic farms, as well as 
with some policy recommendations. 
 
2. The data 
 
The data were provided by the Ethical and Environmental Certification Institute (ICEA)
2, as an 
abridged and anonymized version of their database on inspections and controls on the organic 
operators.  In  this  report,  we  refer  only  to  the  farm-level  panel  data  that  consist  of  25,600 
observations (the ICEA ‘universe’) for the 2007-2009 period (see Table I).
3 
The dataset represents about 20% of the total Italian organic farms; with the remaining 
organic farms certified by other control bodies.
4 The data are evenly distributed over the country, 
with 37% of the farms located in the southern regions of Italy, 32% in the central regions, and the 
remaining 31% in the northern regions. The panel dataset is not balanced, with the participation 
pattern of farms across years shown in Table I (i.e. the number of the same farms included across 
the years). However, the panel dataset is sufficiently homogeneous, as 6,642 farms (64% of the 
sample) were included over all of the three years, and 1,873 farms (18%) were included for two 
consecutive years.  
Table I. Farm participation patterns: number of the same farms across the years (2007-2009). 
N° of farms  2007  2008  2009 
6,642  √  √  √ 
1,238  √  √  × 
799  ×  ×  √ 
751  √  ×  × 
635  ×  √  √ 
132  √  ×  √ 
114   ×  √   × 
Total Farms   8,763  8,629  8,208 
 
                                                 
2ICEA is among the oldest Italian certification bodies, it has the largest share of inspected farms, and it is one of the partners of 
the CERTCOST project.  
3 In total, inspection and control data for 29,481 farms were included, although data cleaning processes was necessary to purge 
missing information. 
4 Currently, in Italy, there are 16 authorised control bodies, three of which are only allowed to operate in the Bozen province.   5 
The dataset contains basically three types of information: firstly, structural data such as 
farm  size,  type  of  crops  and  of  livestock  production;  secondly,  managerial  data  such  as  the 
availability of a license to sell organic products, farmer’s experience as organic, presence of 
conventional land, processing activity; finally, data on sanctions imposed on the farms according 
to the results of inspections. The average number of inspections per farm was 1.49 per year, and 
these are divided according to annual inspections (1.35 per year), follow-up inspections (0.05 per 
year), and unannounced inspections (0.09 per year). The inspections labelled as annual are on 
average more than 1 per farm/year (which is the mandatory requirement in the EU Regulation), 
as the farms might have been visited one time for each operation (i.e. crop production, animal 
production and processing).  
As ICEA did not record any detailed information on non-compliance, we have used the 
number of sanctions imposed on an operator after the inspections as a proxy for non-compliance. 
In other words, we assumed that non-compliance was followed by sanctions, at the appropriate 
level  of  severity.  Regulation  (EC)  834/07  classifies  non-compliance  as  irregularities  or 
infringements, and it is made clear that the former are less severe than the latter, although no 
explicit definitions are provided.  
Noncompliance, once detected, is followed by the appropriate sanction, which is issued 
by the control body itself for all types of sanction
5. The Accredia
6 guidelines
(8) define five types 
of sanctions that are ranked according to their severity, ranging from warnings to exclusion from 
the organic sector.
7 In the guidelines, there is a strict correlation between non-compliance and 
sanctions, which means that a severe sanction is issued when a severe non-compliance is detected 
(aka, an infringement), and a less severe sanction is issued in response to a correspondingly less 
severe non-compliance (aka, an irregularity). 
For simplicity, in our analysis, we have classified sanctions into two categories (see Table 
II): slight and severe. Slight non-compliance is associated with the sanctions of ‘warning’ (i.e. 
usually a simple letter with specific issues that need to be resolved before the next inspection, 
with no impact on certification) and ‘intimation’ (i.e. a more formal and ultimatum invitation to 
comply to resolve the detected issues, with no immediate impact on certification). Severe non-
                                                 
5 This is not true in all EU countries, as the most severe sanctions in some cases are imposed by the Government. 
6 Accredia is the national authority for accreditation of certification bodies.  
7 An additional sanction category “exclusion for not paying the inspection fees” is reported in the guidelines, but this is not 
considered in the present analysis, as it is not related to non-compliance.   6 
compliance includes the sanctions of ‘suppression’ (i.e. exclusion of the specific product or lot 
from organic certification), ‘suspension’ (i.e. temporary exclusion of the whole farm production 
from certification) and ‘exclusion’ (i.e. permanent exclusion of the farm and its productions from 
organic  certification).  Slight  sanctions  correspond  to  irregularities  that  mainly  arise  from  the 
‘documental area’ of the controls, e.g. missing or incomplete registrations, errors in the farm 
document archiving, lack of response to the control body requests, and/or missing mandatory 
documentation.  Severe  sanctions  correspond  to  infringements,  such  as  incorrect  product 
identification  and  labelling,  use  of  non-permitted  substances,  and/or  cultivation  of  ‘parallel’ 
organic and conventional crops (e.g. organic and conventional wheat grown on the same farm in 
the same year). Furthermore, severe sanctions can be issued when the problems indicated in a 
slight sanction have not been correctly tackled and resolved by the farmer.   7 
Table II. Classification of the sanctions.  
 
Sanction 
imposed   Description of sanction effects  Sanction 
classification 
Warning  Does not invalidate organic certification.  
Slight  
Intimation  Does not invalidate organic certification, but non-compliance must be solved within 
a specific time period established by the control body. 
Suppression  Implies the prohibition to sell as organic the product for which the non-compliance 
has been detected.  
Severe   Suspension  Implies the prohibition to sell any of the farm products as organic. This is addressed 
to non-compliance that is considered as essential but with reversible effects. 
Exclusion  Implies certification withdrawal. This is addressed to the operator as a result of non-
compliance that was detected as essential and with irreversible effects. 
 
The frequencies of various sanction types in absolute values are shown in Table III. The 
share of slight sanctions decreases significantly over the three years considered: from 11.78% in 
2007, to 7.05% in 2009. On the other hand, for the same period, the share of severe sanctions 
shows a slight increase, from 1.55% in 2007, to 2.62% in 2009. In all three of the years studied, 
the  number  of  slight  sanctions  was  a  lot  higher  than  the  number  of  severe  sanctions,  as 
infringements generally occur less frequently than irregularities. Over the three years covered by 
the  analysis,  there  was  a  considerably  high  proportion  of  cases  with  zero  sanctions,  ranging 
between 88.22% and 98.45%, for slight and severe sanctions, respectively.  
Table III. Frequencies of sanction occurrence by type and year. 
No of sanctions 
per farm 
Slight Sanctions  Severe Sanctions 
  2007  2008  2009  2007  2008  2009 
0  8,024  8,082  7,778  8,665  8,436  8,034 
1  494  407  302  67  142  142 
2  216  116  113  26  46  24 
3  11  13  9  3  4  7 
4  17  10  6  2  1  1 
5  1  0  0  0  0  0 
6  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Total farms   8,763  8,629  8,208  8,763  8,629  8,208 
Total sanctions  1,032  724  579  136  250  215 
(%)  11.78  8.39  7.05  1.55  2.90  2.62 
 
In the present study, we are interested in factors that can impact on the likelihood of an 
operator to get a slight and/or severe sanction. Therefore, the data on the sanctions was analysed 
according to a set of potentially relevant risk factors (taken from the variables available in the   8 
dataset),  which  we  have  classified  as  farm  structural  and  managerial  risk  factors,  and  crop/ 
livestock-specific risk factors (see Table IV).  
Table IV. Variables (risk factors) included in the models.  
Variables  Code and description 
Type of sanction     
Severe sanction    = 1 if severe sanction was imposed on an operator; = 0 otherwise 
Slight sanction    = 1 if slight sanction was imposed on an operator; = 0 otherwise 
Managerial factors     
Conventional area    = 1 if the farm has conventional area; = 0 otherwise  
Complexity of crop 
production  
  Crop Shannon index  
Complexity of livestock 
production 
  Livestock Shannon index  
Licence    = 1 if the farm is licenced to sell products as organic; = 0 otherwise 
On-farm processing    = 1 if there are on-farm processing operations; = 0 otherwise 
Organic experience    = 1 if the experience in organic farming is >9 years; = 0 if the experience < 9 
years 
Structural Factors     
Cattle    = 1 if the farm has cattle; 0 = otherwise 
Cereals    = 1 if cereals are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Citrus    = 1 if citrus are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Dry pulses    = 1 if dry pulses are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Fallow    = 1 if fallow is present; 0 = otherwise 
Farm size    Total agricultural area (km
2)  
Fruit    = 1 if fruit are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Goats    = 1 if the farm has goats; 0 = otherwise 
Grapes    = 1 if grapes are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Grasslands    = 1 if grasslands are present; 0 = otherwise 
Green Fodder    = 1 if green fodder is cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Green Manure    = 1 if green manure is produced; 0 = otherwise 
Industrial Crops    = 1 if industrial crops are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Olives    = 1 if olives are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Pigs    = 1 if the farm has pigs; 0 = otherwise 
Poultry    = 1 if the farm has poultry; 0 = otherwise 
Root Crops    = 1 if root crops are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
Sheep    = 1 if the farm has sheep; 0 = otherwise 
Vegetables    = 1 if vegetables are cultivated; 0 = otherwise 
 
For the potential risk factors, we formulated the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Slight and Severe non-compliance are co-dependent.   
The small time dimension of our panel dataset does not allow an investigation of the effects of 
farmer fraud behaviour in the past. However, given that a farmer can be sanctioned in the same 
year for different non-compliance, both slight and severe, we can analyse if the two types of non-
compliance are interrelated. Severe and slight sanctions detected within the same year are used in 
the  slight  sanctions  and  severe  sanctions  models,  respectively.  Dummies  for  both  slight  and 
severe sanctions were considered.    9 
 
H2: Farmers who sell their products on the organic market, where they are paid premium prices, 
have greater incentive to non-compliance than those who just limit themselves to receive organic 
area subsidies and then sell their products on the conventional market. At the same time, licenced 
farmers might face more bureaucracy, and thus might be more likely to be non-compliant.   
In Italy, to sell your products as organic, a special ‘licence’ is required from the control body, 
which issues specific authorization that identifies each lot produced/ processed and shipped. In 
our dataset, only 40% of the farmers had a licence to sell organic products.  
 
H3: Larger farms are more likely to be non-compliant. 
Control bodies consider farm size (total land area) as a risk factor for non-compliance, as this 
makes non-compliance more rewarding (the values at stake are higher: i.e. fraudster economies of 
scale). 
 
H4: The risk of non-compliance increases with farm management complexity. 
A farm with a complex crop rotation, and/or different parallel livestock productions could more 
likely  be  noncompliant  due  to  managerial  errors  and/or  difficulties  in  matching  the  organic 
standards for all products.  
A measure of farm (management) complexity can be approximated by the number of crops or 
livestock types on a farm. A Shannon Index was used to measure the structure complexity of both 
the crops and livestock. The Shannon Index calculations referred to the EUROSTAT-coded crop 
and livestock categories used for the analysis.  
 
The Shannon index
(9) for each crop ci or livestock species li was computed as follows:   
 
 
€ 
Crops−Shannon =− (ci
i=1
k
∑ lnci)
  (1) 
 
 
€ 
Livestock−Shannon =− (li
i=1
n
∑ lnli)
  (2) 
   10 
The occurrence of on-farm processing activities is also connected with H4. On-farm processing 
activities increase the farm complexity, and might increase the risk of non-compliance. Almost 
17% of the farmers in the sample had processing activities in addition to their standard farming 
activities. 
 
H5:  Farms  that  have  both  organic  and  non-organic  operations  are  more  likely  to  be  non-
compliant. 
According to EC Regulation 834/07, if a farm is not fully organically managed, then the risk of 
the co-mingling of organic and non-organic operations might increase. Therefore, farms with 
conventional land might be more likely to get sanctions. Almost 10% of the farms in the dataset 
had conventional land.  
 
H6: The farmer ‘organic experience’, i.e. the number of years the farm has been organically 
managed, should reduce the risk of non-compliance . 
The number of years a farmer has been certified by ICEA was taken as a proxy here, as the 
information on the actual number of years a farm was organically managed was not available. 
This variable therefore might underestimate the actual experience, as it does not consider possible 
years  of  certification  with  different  control  bodies  in  the  past,  or  even  periods  of  organic 
management before the EU organic Regulation was introduced. 
 
Apart from these six hypotheses, we examined whether any specific crop or livestock 
increased (or decreased) the risk of non-compliance. This part of the analysis resembled more a 
data mining exercise than theory-based empirical testing. However, we felt that this information 
might be useful, to uncover latent risk factors that can be used to plan risk-based inspections in 
the future.   
For  the  specific  risk  factors  related  to  crops  and  livestock,  the  information  was 
standardised  using  the  EUROSTAT  classifications.  Thirteen  categories  of  crop  types  were 
considered as dummies in the model. The crop categories were: arable crops (cereals, industrial 
crops, dry pulses, root crops), fodder crops (grasslands, green fodder), permanent crops (olives, 
grapes,  fruit,  citrus),  vegetables,  and  unused  land  (green  manure,  fallow).  Using  these 
explanatory variables, we wanted to test some of the assumptions of risks as reported by the 
Accredia guidelines (e.g. that fruit and vegetables on an organic farm increase the probability of   11 
non-compliance). For the livestock types, five main categories were considered as dummies in 
the model: cattle, pigs, sheep, goats and poultry. The presence of crops and livestock types on the 
farms was measured with the dummy variables (see Table IV).  
 
3. Model specification 
 
Count data are specific cases of discrete data where the dependent variable takes only the integer 
non-negative values that arise from counting, rather than ranking. The data on the sanctions 
imposed on a farm as a consequence of the detection of non-compliance are the count data. The 
statistical treatment of count data is different from that of binary data or multiple-choice models, 
where the observations can take only two, or at least only a few, values. Linear regression models 
have frequently been used to count outcomes; however, there are several serious problems in the 
estimation of event-count data models with standard least squares.
(10, 11) For this reason, statistical 
methods specifically designed for count data, such as Poisson and negative binomial regression 
models, might be more appropriate for the study.  
However, in the case where the event counts are characterized by a large number of zero 
observations, the traditional application of a Poisson or negative binomial model might not be 
accurate. In our case, we observe an excess of zeros in the data (see Table III), that may be due to 
two  reasons.  On  the  one  hand,  we  assume  that  most  of  the  organic  farmers  are  normally 
complying  with  the  organic  regulations,  and  that  non-compliance  is  due  to  opportunistic 
behaviours, aiming at immediate practical advantages, though improper or forbidden. On the 
other hand, in any inspection system, the risk of potential ‘under-reporting’ of non-compliance/ 
sanctions is part of the problem. While the risk of ‘false-positive’ non-compliance is actually not 
relevant here (even in the case of product samples taken and tested for non-permitted substances, 
there is always a second testing procedure before the sanctions are imposed), the risk of ‘false-
negative’  non-compliance  is  intrinsically  related  to  any  inspection  procedure.  Therefore,  we 
expect that the level of detected non-compliance is lower than the actual non-compliance; e.g. as 
far as we know, in everyday life, we do not have to pay a fine every time we ever exceed a speed 
limit.  
We have no information in our dataset relating to factors that concern under-reporting. 
However, a panel specification of the model allows the heterogeneity due to potential under-
reporting to be considered in the individual random effects. Panel models allow general types of   12 
individual heterogeneity.
(12, 13) Panel estimators can provide estimates that do not suffer from the 
inconsistencies due to latent individual effects. In a cross-sectional model, while estimating the 
relationships between the number of sanctions and the variables that represent the potential risk-
factors, the only way to control for heterogeneity might be for the inclusion of other farm-specific 
variables. If there is not sufficient data that refer to such farm-specific variables that can lead to 
heterogeneity,  individual  effects  remain  unmeasured  and  pass  into  the  error  term  as  latent 
individual effects, which can produce inconsistent estimates in cross-sectional modelling. Instead, 
panel data models can be specified that follow the standard distinction between random-effects 
and fixed-effects approaches. Random-effects models assume that the individual effects follow a 
stochastic process, which might be a consistent specification for the handling of the issue of 
potential under-reporting. However, random effects require independency between the individual 
effects and the regressors; fixed-effects models relax this assumption, at the cost of a lower 
efficiency  and  of  the  impossibility  to  obtain  an  estimation  of  the  time  invariant  regression 
coefficients (see, among others, Hsiao;
(14) Baltagi
(15)). 
To  handle  count  data  with  excess  zeroes,  in  a  study  on  defects  in  manufacturing, 
Lambert
(16)  proposed  a  technique  called  zero-inflated  Poisson  (ZIP)  regression.  A  number  of 
other  studies,  such  as  Mullahy,
(17)  Long
(18)  and  Greene,
(19)  concluded  that  ZIP,  or  negative 
binomial regression, represents a practical way to model count data with excess zeroes. The zero-
inflated model assumes a two-fold generation process for data: a zero-state process, where only 
zeroes are expected, and a count-state process where count data (including some zeroes) are 
expected. If the heterogeneity effects due to the potential underestimation of sanction occurrence 
is captured in the individual effect, the zero-state can therefore refer to the normally compliant 
organic farmers, who will be non-compliant only out of error. The count-state then refers to the 
organic  farmers,  who  consider  non-compliance  as  an  option  where  there  should  be  positive 
expected net benefits from their non-compliant, opportunistic behaviour. In other words, in a ZIP 
model, the expected number of sanctions for the zero-state process is Yit = 0, with a probability 
pit, while the expected number of sanctions for the count-state process is Yit =j, with a Poisson 
distribution and a probability 1-pit. The probabilities of the possible outcomes are: 
 
Prob (Yit = 0) = pit + (1- pit)Rit(0) 
Prob (Yit = j) = 1- (1- pit)Rit(j) 
   13 
where: 
 
Rit(j) is the Poisson probability = 
€ 
e
−λitλit
yit /yit!; 
€ 
λit= exp(βi’xit), where xit is the set of variables that explains the count-state regime (including 
individual random effects); 
pit is a logistic distribution, such that pit = exp(γ'zit)/[1+ exp(γ'zit)], where zit is the set of variables 
that explains the zero-state regime.  
 
The Poisson is a parsimonious count-model formulation, as it imposes the condition that 
the mean and variance of the process are the same (equidispersion). Other count distributions can 
be considered, like negative binomial and gamma distributions (see, among others, Cameron and 
Trivedi
(12, 20, 21); Boucher et al.
(22)), which allow for a more general formulation of the dispersion, 
at the cost of higher numbers of parameters that need to be estimated. In panel random-effects 
models in particular, a negative binomial of gamma specification for the count state might over-
parameterise the model. Indeed, the random-effects estimator actually adds a heterogeneity term 
to the standard Poisson specification - the individual random effect.
(23)  
Given  these  considerations,  we  used  a  random-effects  panel  estimator  based  on  ZIP 
specification. Two distinct models were considered: one for the slight sanctions, and one for the 
severe sanctions. The zero-count regime is modelled using the following variables: longer than 
10 years organic experience of a farmer, the occurrence of other sanctions (slight sanctions for 
the severe sanction model, and vice  versa), and farms with conventional (non-organic) land. 
Limited farmer experience could be a proxy for the adoption of organic practices at the turn of 
the century, the years when organic farming in Italy experienced particularly favourable market 
and policy conditions that might have attracted more opportunistic farmers. Information or data 
concerning individual farmer-specific attitudes to fraud are not included in the data; we only have 
information  about  the  behaviour  of  a  farmer,  i.e.  if  she  has  committed  any  type  of  non-
compliance. We thus used the occurrence of other sanctions as a proxy for the attitude of a farmer 
to non-compliance. Finally, if a farm is not totally converted to organic (and therefore still has 
conventional land use) this might be another indicator of the opportunistic behaviour of a farmer. 
The rest of the risk factors discussed in the previous section are used as explanatory variables for 
the count regime of the ZIP model.    14 
 
4. Results  
 
A testing procedure was followed to check on the critical steps in the estimation (Table V). First, 
we performed a test to determine the statistical significance of individual effects, the results of 
which indicate the preference for the use of a panel estimator.  
A  Hausman  test  for  the  choice  between  random-effects  and  fixed-effects  panel 
specifications was performed. However, in our dataset (based mainly on dummy variables for 
crops and livestock), within-individual variation is extremely low, and near to zero for most of 
the explanatory variables, as most of these are structural variables, which have very low variation 
across  the  limited  time  span  of  our  database.  The  fixed-effect  approach  in  our  case  cannot, 
therefore, be considered as a feasible option. Indeed, the Hausman test computation fails, due to 
the  extremely  low  within-individual  variability  for  most  of  the  explanatory  variables,  which 
causes singularity in the covariance matrix of the fixed-effects estimator. Under such conditions, 
the choice of the random-effects option cannot be rejected;
(25) a random-effects formulation is 
also consistent with our requirement for the handling of heterogeneity due to potential latent 
under-reporting effects, which are likely to be randomly distributed across individuals. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Poisson specification requires equidispersion 
(equal mean and variance): we could not perform the standard testing based on the comparison 
between Poisson and negative binomial models,
(26) as the latter could not be estimated, due to 
overparameterisation  of  the  random-effects  ZIP  model  (see  section  3  for  details).  The 
performance of the ZIP model with respect to standard Poisson specification has been considered 
by the comparison of both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion  (BIC),  which  can  be  considered  as  a  feasible  solution  when  comparing  non-nested 
models, as in our case (see, for example, Anderson;
(28) Boucher et al.,
(22) for an application to 
count vs. zero-inflated models). Also, a Vuong test
8 was performed, for a comparison of the ZIP 
versus standard Poisson model, and the results support the choice of the ZIP model. 
Table V presents the results of the ZIP regression panel data model for both slight and 
severe sanctions. The zero-state part of the model, specified as a Logit process, estimates the 
coefficients of the actors used to discriminate between the two regimes. A positive and significant 
                                                 
8 See chapter 25 in Greene
(26) for more details on the Vuong statistic used for testing non-nested models.    15 
coefficient indicates that the respective variable increases the probability of a farm belonging to 
the zero state. The effects of the occurrence of other sanctions is significant and negative for both 
models,. Conventional land has significant coefficients for both the slight and severe sanctions 
models, although with opposite signs. In the slight sanction model, farms with conventional land 
are more likely to belong to the zero state, which is counter-intuitive. In the severe sanction 
model, farms with conventional land are less likely to belong to the zero state, as theoretically 
expected.  
Finally, the organic experience of the farmer is significant only in the severe sanctions 
model, and the sign of the coefficient fulfils the theoretical expectations: farmers that have been 
certified for at least 10 years are more likely to be in the zero-state group. In contrast, in the slight 
sanction model, this variable does not contribute towards any prediction of either of the two 
states. 
The count-state part of the model, which is specified as a Poisson process, estimates the 
coefficients for the factors that influence the number of detected sanctions by the control body 
during the inspection. Here, a positive and significant coefficient indicates that the respective risk 
factor increases the probability that a farm has a higher number of sanctions. The coefficients 
referring  to  grapes,  grasslands,  cattle  and  poultry  show  positive  and  statistically  significant 
coefficients  for  both  the  slight  and  severe  sanctions  models.  Cereals  and  pigs  increase  the 
probability of severe sanctions, while farm size, on-farm processing, root crops, green fodder and 
dry pulses increase the probability of slight sanctions. Negative effects on sanction probabilities 
were only found for fruit in the slight sanction model, and olives in the severe sanction model.    16 
Table V. Results of the Zero-Inflated Poisson models for slight sanctions and severe sanctions.  
Variable  Coefficient 
(Risk factor)  Slight sanctions   Severe sanctions 
Zero-count (logit) regime 
Conventional area  0.72362857***  -0.68300107*** 
Organic experience  0.08856185  0.32120589** 
Severe sanctions  -0.47064064*  - 
Slight sanctions  -  -0.40674891* 
Constant  .86904743***  2.51739201*** 
Poisson-count regime 
Cattle  0.63029210***  0.56358781** 
Cereals  -0.08505534  0.67003519*** 
Citrus  0.00625110  0.16882903 
Complexity of crop 
production 
0.13706860  0.02033748 
Complexity of 
livestock production 
-0.35852074  -0.55898482 
Dry pulses  0.24686992*  0.17904731 
Fallow  0.06123420  0.13430100 
Farm size  0.06327743***  0.03004482 
Fruit  -0.33090595***  -0.21826444 
Goats  0.18470816  -0.09234492 
Grapes  0.31004147***  0.50096075*** 
Grasslands  0.44784066***  0.33792005** 
Green fodder  0.25491331***  0.23546017 
Green manure  0.07100406  0.11021614 
Industrial crops  -0.02446424  0.18836969 
Licence  0.04596450  0.11757959 
Olives  0.03837277  -0.44052393*** 
On-farm processing  0.48178438***  0.45950137 
Pigs  -0.12815705  0.65817623** 
Poultry  0.35142671*  0.80354488* 
Root crops  0.27192486*  -0.35106104 
Sheep  0.82248706  0.18849671 
Vegetables  0.05741346  0.33845876 
Constant  -2.04668225***  -2.04715646*** 
Obs. Number  25.600  25.600 
AIC ZIP  0.56689  0.19598 
AIC Poisson  0.57701  0.20206 
BIC ZIP  0.57612  0.20521 
BIC Poisson  0.58593  0.21065 
Lr Test Panel vs. 
Pooled prob ≥chibar2 
0.000  0.000 
Vuong test ZIP vs 
Poisson 
-65.96  -17.69 
 
Zero-count regime: positive coefficients refer to risk factors increasing the probability of a farm to belong to the zero 
state  (i.e.  compliant  farmer);  Poisson-count  regime:  positive  coefficients  refers  to  risk  factors  increasing  the 
probability of non-compliance. 
Levels of significance: * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001  
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5. Discussion  
 
The  data  presented  in  the  previous  section  relate  the  probability  of  non-compliance  (rectius 
sanction)  to  a  number  of  structural  and  managerial  risk  factors,  such  as  specific  crops  and 
livestock  production.  These  data  need  to  be  interpreted  with  caution  to  avoid  inappropriate 
simplifications.  
Only a subset of the common risk factors is found in both the slight sanction and the 
severe sanction models. Such a result is relevant, as it shows that a general risk evaluation for 
non-compliance considered with no distinction between slight and severe sanctions, could be 
partial or misleading. In the zero-state part of the model, this aspect is well illustrated by the 
contrasting results in terms of the conventional land coefficients. The coefficient of conventional 
land in the slight sanctions model shows a rather counter-intuitive sign, as we expected that 
farmers with conventional land might show higher risks of non-compliance.  
To discuss the results of the whole model (both the zero-state and Poisson-state parts), we 
have  taken  the  Accredia  RT16  guidelines
(8)  as  a  benchmark.  In  these  guidelines,  this  Italian 
accreditation authority establishes a framework for the attribution of a risk rating to each farm. 
This risk rating, which ranges from 1 to 3, is based on a number of variables (risk factors) and is 
used  to  determine  the  number  of  visits  that  each  farm  will  be  subjected  to  (including  the 
mandatory  annual  inspection).  Our  data  are  partially  consistent  with  the  indications  of 
Accredia.
(8)  
On the one hand, among those factors that appear as relevant in both of the sanctions 
models,  livestock,  grapes,  and  occurrence  of  previous/  other  sanctions  are  coherent  with  the 
framework of the Accredia guidelines. The picture that emerges from our analysis is that cattle 
and monogastrics (pigs and poultry) increase the risk of sanctions (pigs are only significant in the 
severe sanction model). In general, livestock operations appear to be associated with greater risk. 
Indeed, farms with dry pulses, grassland, green fodder and root crops, which are often part of the 
rotation scheme of farms with animal production, are more likely to have slight sanctions.   
On the other hand, cereals and grassland are not considered as risk crops by Accredia. As 
32% of the farms produced cereals (as the average over the 3 years), it is probably a very general 
factor. However, as it is significant for severe sanctions, coupled with grassland, it might simply 
confirm the higher risk of certain kinds of livestock operations: cereals enter as animal feed in the   18 
diet of cattle and monogastrics, and in organic farms a high proportion of this feed needs to be 
produced on-farm.  
Farm size appears as a risk factor in both the Accredia guidelines and in our data, at least 
with respect to irregularities: larger farms are more likely to commit slight non-compliance. 
Fruit  production  does  not  emerge  in  our  analysis  as  a  relevant  risk  factor  for  severe 
sanctions, and it is even negatively correlated with the probability of slight sanctions. This result 
is  in  contrast  to  the  indications  of  Accredia,  where  all  fruit  operations  are  considered  to  be 
associated with increased risk.
(8) In our analysis only grapes, rather than all fruit, are a risk-
associated crops. Citrus fruit are also non-significant for predicting risk. Our data provide a more 
detailed picture than the Accredia a-priori, rule-based approach.   
Finally, farmers who have a licence to sell organic products are included by Accredia as 
the maximum risk operators. Our evidence contradicts this risk hypothesis, although the approach 
used by Accredia for the definition of this risk factor is not simply related to the probability of the 
occurrence of non-compliance, but also to the impact that a non-compliant licenced farmer would 
have on the organic market.   
In summary, our results do not confirm hypothesis H2. For the other hypotheses, we see 
only partial confirmation for hypothesis H4 (on-farm processing is significant in the prediction of 
the risk of slight sanctions) and hypothesis H5 (non-organic operations appear to increase the risk 
of severe non-compliance only). From our dataset, hypotheses H1, H3 and H6 appear to hold up 
to empirical verification. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
A first result that has emerged from our analysis is that slight and severe sanctions are associated 
to different risk patterns. A lack of discrimination between these two types of sanctions might 
thus lead to inappropriate modelling and misleading results. This should be considered when 
planning risk-based inspections, as the Accredia guidelines are designed to do. 
Another important consequence of our findings is that based on these currently available 
data, a risk-based inspection strategy will be relatively difficult to implement. The inspection data 
mainly contain data on the structural aspects of the farms, and to a varying degree, some data on 
the  quality/  quantity  of  the  farm  management;  however,  they  contain  little  or  no  personal 
information about the farm operators, the farmers themselves. Indeed, the data collected by the   19 
control bodies (i.e. not only by ICEA) are particularly detailed with respect to the structural 
aspects of the farms. For example, they include very detailed crop classifications, with very little 
information on the farms/ processors (e.g. age of farmer/ processor, when it is a family enterprise, 
their  total  turnover,  their  liabilities  and  debt,  their  solvency).  In  our  analysis  here,  we  were 
obliged to use proxies to model the attitudes towards non-compliance, such as the occurrence of 
other sanctions, the organic experience of the farmers, and the existence of non-organic land on 
the organic farms.  
Similarly, while using models based on evidence of non-compliance– as we have used 
here  –  can  help  in  the  limiting  of  what  we  know  already  about  risk,  this  cannot  avoid 
unpredictable (and potentially disruptive) events based on ‘new’, yet-to-be-discovered factors. 
This is the well-known problem of induction, which was originally proposed by the philosopher 
David Hume
(29). We can rephrase his thoughts in the following way: 
‘No amount of observations of compliant farmers can allow the inference that all similar 
farmers are compliant, but the observation of a single non-compliant farmer is sufficient 
to refute the conclusion’ 
 
Furthermore, as we cannot infer our immortality from the simple observation that we have 
not died yet, we cannot rule out the possibility that an up-to-now compliant operator will breach 
the rules tomorrow; we can only determine which factors will increase this risk, based on what 
we know already.  
We also cannot rule out that in the future new risk factors will emerge, although we can at 
least  insure  ourselves  against  this  asymmetry  of  information  (regarding  the  future)  by  a 
consideration of which type of non-compliant behaviour will have the greatest effects on the 
market and on consumer safety and confidence
(30). An efficient risk-based inspection system, 
therefore,  should  weight  up  the  known  probability  of  occurrence  of  a  given  non-compliance 
according to the severity of its impact (and, possibly, according to the probability of detection of 
the given non-compliance, which is very difficult to assess). Indeed, a risk-based system that 
produces  risk  ratings  is  applied  by  bankers  for  loan  evaluations,  and  by  insurers  for  fixing 
insurance premiums. Similarly, in production engineering, risk ratings form the basis of the well-
known Failure Mode Effect Analysis,
(31) to assist the foolproofing of a process or a design. We 
thus believe that an efficient and effective inspection system in organic farming should be more 
explicitly modelled according to such risk-based approaches.    20 
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